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THE IMPACT OF CHINA'S
ANTITRUST LAW AND OTHER
COMPETITION POLICIES ON U.S.
COMPANIES
By Susan Beth Farme2
T he House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courtsand Competition Policy, held a hearing on July 13, 2010, to
address the impact of Chinese antitrust law on American
businesses.' International competition law and enforcement raise
serious policy issues. Congressional attention is appropriately
focused on these important questions. The Chinese Anti-
Monopoly law is now two years old, having gone into effect on
August 1, 2008. Since its adoption, three separate agencies have
been organized to enforce various aspects of the law, to issue a
variety of rules, regulations, and procedures, and to investigate
and make rulings on individual cases. Importantly, a number of
these decisions have involved (and affected) American businesses
operating in China.
In assessing the impact of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly
This article is based on the author's testimony before the House
Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy
(July 13, 2010).
2 Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University Law School. Fulbright
Scholar, University of International Business and Economics (Beijing, China,
spring 2008); J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A., Wellesley College.
The author would like to thank Yee Wah Chin and Vanessa Yanhua Zhang
for their expertise on the Chinese AML, Ma Lian .for her translation of the
Provisional Divestiture Rules, and the other panel members, Mr. Barnett, Mr.
Lipsky, and Mr. Singh, for their insights into Chinese competition law.
Also testifying were Thomas 0. Barnett, partner with Covington &
Burling, LLP and former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, U.S.
Department of Justice (testifying in his personal capacity); Abbot B. Lipsky,
Jr., partner with Latham & Watkins, LLP; Shanker Singham, partner with
Squire Sanders, LLP and Chair of the International Roundtable on Trade and
Competition Policy (testifying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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Law, it is appropriate to begin with the words of American
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, as written in The Common Law.4
He explained the following:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy.. .have had a good deal more to do than
the syllogism in determining the. rules by which men
should be governed. The law embodies the story of a
nation's development through many centuries, and it
cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms
and corollaries of a book of mathematics.'
The 'experience' of Chinese antitrust law encompasses the
language of the statute, agency interpretations and decisions, and
judicial rulings, which have all been made against the backdrop
of history. This experience reveals in microcosm the challenges of
a jurisdiction in the process of moving from legal and economic
theory to enacted statutory law, rules of implementation,
construction of an efficient apparatus to enforce those rules, and
then, finally, to actual enforcement within a system that has
grown very quickly, potentially outstripping its administrative
capacity. With that in mind, this article highlights the following
key trends in the development and application of the law:
1. The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law ("AML") is not a
radical departure from mainstream competition law; covering
the same categories of business conduct as the American
Sherman6 and Clayton Acts': horizontal cartels, anticompetitive
mergers, monopolization, and unreasonable restraints' on
distribution. In its specific language, the AML is more directly
modeled on the European competition articles, which also reach
4 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1881).
Id.
6Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1-2 (2004). Section 1 states that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade ... is declared to be illegal." Section 2 provides that "[e]very
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize ... shall be deemed
guilty of a felony ... "
7 Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994),
specifically discusses mergers and acquisitions.
2010] 35
Loyola Consumer Law Review
cartel behavior, -abuses of dominant position, horizontal and
vertical agreements, and anticompetitive mergers.8 However,
diverging from the American model of enforcement,' three
government agencies are responsible for enforcing separate
provisions of the AML.'0 In another departure from American
antitrust policy, the Chinese antitrust law explicitly incorporates
additional, non-competition factors into the analysis."
2. American businesses may be particularly affected by
the Chinese merger control provisions because the law and its
regulations require pre-merger notification based on the parties'
total sales in China (not solely the nexus of the transaction to
China).12  During the first year of the AML, more than fifty
8 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 101-102, 2004
O.J. (C 83) 88-89 [hereinafter Treaty], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:P
DF. Art. 101 discusses agreements and Art. 102 concerns abuses of dominant
market position. See Council Regulation 139/2004, Jan. 20, 2004, O.J. (L 24) 1
-22.
' The American federal antitrust laws are enforced by two federal
agencies: the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). Both agencies are empowered to enforce
the anti-merger provisions of the Clayton Act, § 7. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(2010). The Antitrust Division also has jurisdiction to investigate and enforce
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 1, 2, and 3, civilly for damages or equitable relief or,
where authorized, with criminal penalties. The FTC has jurisdiction under
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41. The relevant coordinate
trade regulation provision, § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45, provides that the FTC has
the "power to prohibit . . . [u]nfair methods of competition ... " including by
administrative adjudication, enforcement in federal court, or in the exercise of
its rulemaking powers, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46.
" Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China [hereinafter
AML], art. 10, available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-
02/10/content_17254169.htm. Article 10 of the AML provides that "The anti-
monopoly law enforcement agency designated by the State Council
(hereinafter referred to as the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency under
the State Council) shall be responsible for the anti-monopoly law enforcement
work." Three separate entities have been empowered to enforce the provisions
of the AML: The Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM") is responsible for
merger review, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce ("SAIC")
is responsible for abuse of dominance, non-price agreements, and abuses of
administrative power, and the National Development and Reform
Commission ("NDRC") is responsible for enforcing the provisions concerning
price agreements.
" Id.
12 The Decree of the State Council of the People's Republic of China No.
529, Rules of the State Council on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations
of Undertakings (promulgated by the P.R.C State Council., Aug. 1, 2008)
available at
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transactions were reviewed." Of that total number, one proposed
merger was prohibited and five were approved with conditions.14
All of these latter six transactions involved at least one foreign
firm: Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, InBev/Anheuser Busch, Mitsubishi
Rayon/Lucite, Pfizer/Wyeth, GM/Delphi and Sanyo/Panasonic."s
The agency guidelines and language of the available decisions.
employ mainstream analytic concepts, but also may import non-
economic factors such as "national economic development" and
"national security" in mergers involving foreign investors."
Greater transparency in the analysis would facilitate business
planning and international investment.
3. American antitrust law prohibits monopolization, 8
and, as has been described, the equivalent European provision
prohibits abuse of a dominant market position." The AML
prohibits abuse of dominant market positions and "monopoly
agreements," which do not require market power as a
prerequisite.2 0  Recent draft regulations issued by the State
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/column/print.shtml?/c/200903/20090306071501
(China) providing: "Where a concentration of undertakings meets any of the
below thresholds, a pre-merger notification shall be filed with the competent
commercial authority under the State Council, and no concentration shall be
implemented without a notification: The total worldwide turnover of all
undertakings to the concentration in the previous fiscal year exceeds RMB 10
billion, and the PRC turnover of at least each of two undertakings in the
previous fiscal year exceeds RMB 400 million; The total PRC turnover of all
undertakings to the concentration in the previous fiscal year exceeds RMB 2.0
billion, and the PRC turnover of at least each of two undertakings in the
previous fiscal year exceeds RMB 400 million."
" Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, Chinese Merger Control:
Patterns and Implications, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 477, 478 (2009). The
article reports that MOFCOM had "received" 58 merger notifications and
reviewed and closed 46 of them.
" Hannah C.L. Ha, et al., China's Anti-Monopoly Law Merger Control
Regime - 10 Key Questions Answered (part 1), Mayer-Brown JSM (Mar. 2,
2010), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public-docs/Client-
UpdateChina.pdf.
" Id.
16 AML, supra note 10, at art. 27(5).
1 AML, supra note 10, at art. 31.
sUnlawful monopolization requires more than merely a large share of a
market. The elements of the offense are (1) monopoly power and (2) predatory
or anticompetitive conduct. Sherman Act §1 also prohibits horizontal and
vertical conspiracies and agreements in restraint of trade. A discussion of such
agreements is beyond the scope of this article.
" See Treaty note 8, supra. The relevant provision of the AML is
linguistically identical to this article.
20 AML, supra note 10, at art. 13 and art. 14.
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Administration for Industry and Commerce ("SAIC") may be so
broad that they could limit the ability of large firms to compete;
for example, by choosing to deal, or refusing to deal, with
particular firms in future business transactions, under the first
provision,2 1 or prohibit purely parallel behavior under the latter. 22
The Abuse of Dominance regulations also appear to include a
non-competition factor into the analysis, requiring consideration
of the "impact of relevant actions on the economic operation
efficiency, social public interests and economic development."2 3
The Chinese agencies have not yet brought cases charging abuse
of dominance and the private cases to date have not involved
American firms. Further experience is needed to know whether
21 Regulations on the Prohibition of the Abuse of Dominant Market
Positions by Industrial & Commercial Administrative Authorities (Draft for
Comments) (promulgated by the SAIC, May 25, 2010) unofficial translation by
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP (on file with author) [hereinafter Abuse
of Dominant Market Positions]. Article 4 prohibits firms with a dominant
market position from a variety of activities, absent justification, including, for
example, "suspending current transactions" with a firm (Art. 4(2)), "refusing to
enter into new transactions" with the firm (Art. 4(3)), or "making it difficult for
the counter-party to continue transactions with it by setting restrictive
conditions" (Art. 4(4)).
22 Regulations on the Prohibitions of Actions Involving Monopoly
Agreements by Industrial & Commercial Administrative Authorities (Draft for
comments) (promulgated by the SAIC, May 25, 2010) unofficial translation by
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP (on file with author). Article 2 prohibits
monopoly agreements, including "other concerted actions to eliminate or
restrict competition." The term "other concerted actions" is defined to include
''virtually existing concerted actions among undertakings even though there
are no expressly concluded written or oral agreements or decisions." Article 3
sets out the relevant factors necessary to find these concerted actions.
Communication among the parties, consistency of their actions, and the
presence or absence of business justifications are listed among these factors.
However, the Article does not specifically require an actual agreement, express
or implied. The United States Supreme Court stated more than 50 years ago
that, 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman
Act entirely." Theatre Ent., Inc. v. Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
541 (1954) (noting that "this Court has never held that proof of parallel
business behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently,
that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense."); Interstate Cir.
v. U.S., 306 U.S. 208, 225 (1939) (finding that a variety of factors including
proposed agreements communicated to all parties, actions against individual
self interest but beneficial if taken in concert, and failure to explain the
circumstances, "when uncontradicted and with no more explanation ..'Justify
the inference that the distributors acted in concert, and in common
agreement.").
23 Abuse of Dominant Market Positions, supra note 21.
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the application of Chinese competition law in these areas is
consistent with mainstream analysis.
4. Even after decades of liberalization and privatization,
thousands of State Owned Enterprises ("SOEs") may account for
as much as half the economy.24 These Chinese firms include
traditional utilities as well as industrial sectors of the economy.
Although SOEs meet the definition of "business operators" under
the AML, they may be subject to different standards and sectoral
regulations, even if they possess a dominant share of the market.25
5. In the field of intellectual property, dual policy
concerns should be promoted. First, legitimate intellectual
property rights ("IPR") are entitled to protection against
infringement. Second, the mere exercise of an IPR should not be
deemed to be unlawful monopolization. The first concern is
addressed under Chinese laws on patents, copyrights and
trademarks, and in international agreements which China has
joined. Second, the AML, consistent with U.S. antitrust law,
apparently provides that exercising intellectual property rights is
not prohibited; patents, for example, are not unlawful abuses of
dominance in and of themselves.
Background and Structure of the Chinese Competition Law
Globally, competition laws have been developing at a
rapid pace over the past several decades. These laws are
supported by technical assistance and recommendations from a
diverse collection of organizations, including: the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD"),27 the
24 See Joel R. Samuels, "Tain't What You Do": Effect of China's Proposed
Anti-Monopoly Law on State Owned Enterprises, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV.
169 (2007).
25 AML, supra note 10, at art. 7 (providing that "f[w]ith respect to the
industries controlled by the State-owned economy and concerning the lifeline
of national economy and national security ... the State shall protect the lawful
business operations conducted by the business operators therein, and shall
supervise and control the business operations of and the prices of commodities
and services provided by these business operators, so as to protect the
consumer interests and facilitate technological progress.").
26 AML, supra note 10, at art. 55 (providing that it "shall not apply to the
conduct of business operators to exercise their intellectual property rights in
accordance with the laws and relevant administrative regulations on
intellectual property rights; however, this Law shall apply to the conduct of
business operators to eliminate or restrict market competition by abusing their
intellectual property rights.").
27 See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD "),28 and the International Competition Network
("ICN").29  China adopted the AML, its first comprehensive
antitrust law of general application, in 2007, and it became
effective on August 1, 2008.30 It was part. of important legal
reforms that began as early as the "reform and opening up" of
1978, and implementation of the "socialist market economy" in
1992.
Antitrust law is comprised of distinct types of trade
restraints, including the following: horizontal agreements, which
cover hardcore cartels 32 and other pro-competitive price" and
non-price cooperation agreements;34 vertical price and non-price
distribution restraints," including resale price maintenance3 ' and
tying arrangements;3 monopolization;38 and mergers." Overall,
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.oecd.org.
28 See generally U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., COMPETITION
LAW AND POLICY, http://www.unctad.org.
2 See generally INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK,
http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
' AML, supra note 10. The AML was under development for more than a
decade before it was adopted.
3 Zhenguo Wu, Perspectives on the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, 75
ANTITRUST L.J. 73 (2008); Donald C. Clarke, CHINA: CREATING A LEGAL
SYSTEM FOR A MARKET ECONOMY (2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097587. These articles provide a valuable
description of the history and developments culminating in Chinese law
reform, including adoption of the first antitrust law of general application.
32 Price fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) ("Under the
Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."). Horizontal market allocation
is also per se illegal. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48
(1990) (per curiam).
3 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1
(1979); Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Texaco,
Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
34 See, e..g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary &
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
" Cont'1 T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
36 Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)
(holding that vertical price agreements must be evaluated under the rule of
reason).
1 Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 534 U.S. 952
(2001).
38 Verizon Commc'n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
40 [Vol. 23:1
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the touchstone of antitrust law is the protection of consumer
welfare and promotion of competition, but not special deference
for particular competitors.
There is a general consensus worldwide about many
antitrust issues, but others are marked by divergent views in
different jurisdictions. These differences may arise from the
unique and economic-specific national policies each country's
antitrust laws are designed to promote. For example, there is
widespread agreement that horizontal cartels are among the most
harmful practices and should be prohibited. However, there is
less agreement on the precise contours of where the outside
boundaries lie. For example, whether the appropriate
enforcement mechanism should be limited to governmental
actions or should also provide private rights of action, and
whether criminal or civil remedies are appropriate. Importantly,
there are divergent views with respect to some vertical restraints
and distribution practices.4 0 Monopolization, or abuse of a
dominant position, is another substantive area where there is
general agreement about the competitive harm, but some
divergence about other issues (i.e. whether and under what
circumstances the law can deal with oligopolistic market
structures and where, precisely, the boundary lies between
vigorous competition and unlawful conduct).4 1
Merger control laws fall within a different category of
antitrust enforcement in several respects. Most significantly,
modern merger statutes speak in predictive terms. Mergers may
be prohibited if they "tend substantially to restrict competition" in
U.S. 398 (2004).
3 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010),
http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2010)
[hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines].
40 Leegin, 551 U.S. 877. See also Treaty, supra note 8. But see Tribunal de
Commerce [Commerce Tribunal] Brussels, July 3, 1985, European Court
Reports 2015 [Eur. Ct. Rep.]'1985, Case 243/83, 2015 (Belg.) (vertical price
agreement entitled to an Article 101(3) exemption in some situations).
41 E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 729 F.2d 128
(2d Cir. 1984) (without more, section 5 does not condemn an oligopolistic
industry structure); and Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities
in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by
dominant undertakings, O.J. (C 45), Feb. 24, 2009, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009XCO224(01):EN:
NOT (stating in section II.A.14 that "dominance" is unlikely if a firm's
market share is less than 40% of a relevant market).
412010]
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a properly defined relevant market.4 2  In a globalized world,
many large transactions cross national borders and are thus
subject to review by more than one national antitrust agency.
Some acquisitions may involve key national industries or may
tread upon national security interests or 'national champion
firms.' 43 Finally, government enforcement agencies investigating
proposed mergers do not have the luxury of lengthy
investigations.4 Time is of the essence in a proposed merger and
failure to prohibit a transaction before it is consummated makes
any future challenge as difficult as unscrambling eggs. If
countries operate on different timetables, require merging firms
to produce variant information, or apply different substantive
standards, then the ability to compete cross-border may be
hampered and global economy substantially frustrated.
It is unsurprising that global competition laws diverge in
substance, process, analysis, and fundamental approach to a
greater or lesser degree. The AML follows the approach of the
majority of antitrust laws, dealing separately with agreements in
restraint of trade, monopolization, and mergers.45 The
prohibitions of anticompetitive agreements and monopolization
borrow heavily from the language of Articles 101 and 102 of the
European Union treaty.4 6 There are special provisions covering
SOEs and Administrative Monopolies, both of which are
especially relevant in the Chinese economy. 47 The American
standards on pre-merger notification and substantive analysis
have been influential worldwide; they are clearly the ancestor of
the Chinese merger law.
However, AML Articles 1 and 4 diverge from the
traditional model of antitrust analysis that is based solely on
competition principles. 48  These provisions suggest that
interpretation and application of Chinese antitrust law may differ
in some important respects from American standards. Article 1
42 Clayton Act § 18, supra note 7. Modern merger statutes may even block
potential agreements even before consummation.
4" INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 29.
44 Id.
4 Damien Geradin, The Perils of Antitrust Proliferation - The Process of
'Decentralized Globalization' of Antitrust and the Risk of Over-Regulation of
Competitive Behavior, CHI. J. INT'L L. 189, 189 (2009).
46 See Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 101 and art. 102
4' AML, supra note 10, at ch. I. art. 7 (concerning State-owned enterprises),
art. 8 (prohibition of abuse of administrative authority) and ch. V (abuse of
administrative power)
48 AML, supra note 10, at ch. I art. 1 and art. 4.
42 [Vol. 23:1
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provides that "[t]his law is enacted for the purpose of preventing
and curbing monopolistic conduct, protecting fair market
conditions, enhancing economic efficiency, maintaining the
consumer interests and the public interests, and promoting the
healthy development of socialist market economy."4 9 Article 4
authorizes the State to promulgate and implement competition
rules suitable for the socialist market economy, perfect the
macroeconomic control,s0 and improve a united, open,
competitive, and well-ordered market system.s'
Since 2008, three separate government agencies have been
established and assigned responsibility for individual antitrust
issues under the AML: the Ministry of Commerce Anti-Monopoly
Bureau ("MOFCOM"), the SAIC, and the National Development
and Reform Commission ("NDRC"). The MOFCOM is
responsible for reviewing proposed mergers (referred to as
"concentrations" in the AML) and enforcing the anti-merger
articles of the law; the SAIC has responsibility for enforcing the
prohibitions against abuse of dominant positions, monopoly
agreements, and anti-administrative monopoly regulation; and
the NDRC is responsible for price agreements and has issued
regulations on anti-pricing monopoly regulation. These
categories are not airtight, so it is important that the regulations
are consistent and applied transparently.
The agencies have been busy drafting and adopting rules
and regulations, reviewing mergers, including transactions
involving multinational firms, and rendering decisions in the
nearly two years since the AML became operational. Some of the
proposed regulations have invited comments from interested
parties, including the American Bar Association ("ABA"),
Sections of Antitrust Law, and International Law.52 The
American Chamber of Commerce - People's Republic of China
("AmCham") provided extensive analysis and recommendations
that have been reflected in some revised regulations.
Most recently, SAIC disseminated three regulations on
May 25, 2010, concerning monopoly agreements, abuse of a
dominant market position, and abuse of administrative powers.s3
Comments were invited and provided by the ABA Sections of
4 AML, supra note 10, at ch. I art. 1.
50 AML, supra note 10, at ch. I, art. 4.
s1 Id.
52 Comments of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/comments.shtml
"Abuse of Dominant Market Positions, supra note 21.
2010] 43
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Antitrust Law and International Law, among other parties.5 4
These documents were revisions of earlier drafts and reflect some
of the previous recommendations. On July 5, 2010, the
MOFCOM released a set of provisional rules concerning
divestitures in merger cases, but did not seek comments at this
stage.6 The openness of the Chinese enforcement agencies to
considering views and recommendations of international
competition experts is salutary. International benchmarking and
promulgation of recommended practices have become features of
effective antitrust enforcement in this era of global competition.
Much of the networking now occurs in organizations such as the
International Competition Network, but there is an important
place for bilateral consultation and sharing of expertise among
agencies, and with non-governmental advisors. Future
consultation on these and other draft regulations should be
encouraged and should involve a variety of experts. Ultimately,
clear rules based on sound economic principles will benefit the
agencies enforcing the law, businesses seeking to comply, and the
ultimate consumer. Beyond agency regulation, investigation, and
enforcement, Chinese courts have rendered a number of decisions
in private actions under the dominance articles of the AML, none
involving U.S. businesses.
In a 2010 Policy Brief, the OECD reported on the positive
economic developments and challenges that China faces." The
report praises the growing competitive market economy,
increased privatization, and new antitrust policy, stating that
"market forces are now generally the main determinant of price
formation and economic behaviour."" It recommends lowering
barriers to private competition and promoting foreign investment
by limiting government intervention in markets, including
4 Joint Comments of the American Bar Ass'n Section of Antitrust Law and
Section of Int'l Law on the SAIC Draft Regulations on the Prohibition of Acts
of Monopoly Agreements, of Abuse of Dominant Market Position and of Abuse
of Administrative Powers (July 2, 2010) [hereinafter Joint Comments],
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2010/07-
10/comments_2010_silsaic.pdf.
5 Id. at 7, 9.
56 Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Provisional
Rules on the Implementation of Acquisition or Divestiture of Assets or
Businesses for Concentrations of Business Operators, Notice No. 41, 2010 (July
5, 2010) [hereinafter Provisional Rules].
5 OECD Policy Brief, Economic Survey of China, 2010, Feb. 2010,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/19/44468723.pdf.
58 Id.
44 [Vol. 23:1
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SOEs. 59
The trend toward a market economy in China carries the
promise of continuing harmonization with modern antitrust
analysis, but the AML's application of non-economic factors,
undefined national security considerations in merger review, and
potential special treatment of SOEs all indicate that there may be
some important divergences. American businesses operating in
China are subject to the Chinese antitrust law for the "conduct
[of] economic activities within the People's Republic of China"
and for extraterritorial activities that effectively eliminate or
restrict competition in China.6 0 Indeed, American firms that meet
the threshold turnover in China are subject to the mandatory pre-
merger notification requirements for transactions that may, or
may not, have a significant impact in China.
1. Legal Standards Include Non-Economic Factors
The stated legislative purposes of the AML include
traditional theories of consumer welfare, including: protecting
competition; enhancing efficiency; and prohibiting
monopolization.6 1 Article 1 of the law goes further, however, and
also seeks to advance the "healthy development of [a] socialist
market economy" and promote "public interests."62 These public
policy goals are not defined in the statute, but Article 4 empowers
the State to "make and implement" regulations "suitable for the
socialist market economy, [to] perfect the macro control, and
improve a united, open, competitive and well-ordered market
system. "63
The SAIC Regulations on the Prohibition of the Abuse of
Dominant Market Positions (draft for comments, May 25, 2010),
Article 8, may have incorporated one such non-economic
consideration into the list of justifications for firms charged with
abusing a dominant market position. These listed factors include
competitive effects and business justifications (both traditional
economic considerations), but also the effect on "social public
interests and economic development."6 4 This provision is in
accord with the AML's legislative purposes, but is not generally
5 Id.
60 AML, supra note 10, at ch. I, art. 2.
61 AML, supra note 10, at ch. I, art. 1, 4.
62 AML, supra note 10, at ch. I, art. 1.
63 AML, supra note 10, at ch. I, art. 4.
64 Abuse of Dominant Market Positions, supra note 21.
2010] 45
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within the mainstream of modern antitrust analysis.
2. Merger Regulations and Decisions
Even before the AML, the MOFCOM promulgated
guidelines for foreign acquisitions of Chinese firms. The
Provisions on Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors law (foreign mergers & acquisition rules) provides that
"foreign investors shall comply with the [Chinese] laws...and
adhere to the principles of fairness, reasonableness, compensation
for equal value, and honesty and good faith.. .and shall not ...
disturb the social economic order or harm the societal public
interests ... ."6s Article 12 requires "parties involved in
acquisitions of domestic firms by foreign investors" to obtain
approval if the "acquisition involves any major industry, or has
or may have an impact on the state economy security, or may
result in transfer of the actual controlling right of the domestic
enterprise owning any famous trademarks or traditional Chinese
brands."66 This concept was transplanted, in part, to AML
Article 31, which provides for additional review of transactions
between foreign buyers and domestic firms if "national security"
is implicated." The term "national security" is undefined in the
AML and has not yet been explicated in regulations, so the
breadth of the concept is unclear. It is ambiguous whether this
term includes economic interests of the state or solely national
defense. As discussed above, the potential consideration of non-
economic factors could inhibit competition and decrease
consumer welfare, a result antithetical to the generally recognized
goals of antitrust.
Since 2008, the MOFCOM has supplemented the AML
with a series of regulations that set monetary thresholds for pre-
merger notification, describe the filing requirements in more
detail, define relevant markets, and establish standards for
investigations of transactions below the filing thresholds." These
regulations were first produced in draft form and, in accord with
the best practices recommended above, comments were solicited
6s Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by
Foreign Investors (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, June 22, 2009),
China.
66 Id.
67 AML, supra note 10.
68 Susan Beth Farmer, The Evolution of Chinese Merger Notification
Guidelines: A Work in Progress Integrating Global Consensus and Domestic
Imperatives, 18 TULANE J. INT'T L. & COMP. L. 1, 49 (2009).
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and provided by a number of sources including American
antitrust experts.
Adding to the body of regulatory law, the MOFCOM
distributed new rules on divestiture standards and procedures on
July 5, 2010.70 These regulations are concrete and practical,
applying to any divestiture of assets required by the agency or
agreed by the parties as a condition for approval of the proposed
merger. Generally, the parties are required to maintain any such
assets, operate them independently, and provide information and
assistance to prospective buyers.7" The rules require appointment
of a trustee to monitor the entire process and, if the parties cannot
find an appropriate buyer, require another trustee to do so. 7 2
There was no opportunity to comment on the specifics of the
regulation, but preservation of assets and efficient divestiture
practices appear sound and within the mainstream of antitrust
practice.
The reputation of merger enforcement will depend on
transparent analysis based on sound principals and equitable
treatment of all proposed transactions and whether they involve
foreign or domestic firms. This process has the additional effect
of protecting the competitive process rather than individual
firms, and ultimately benefits consumers by offering more choice
in the competitive market. As Justice Holmes' observation about
the life of laws suggested, the life of the AML, supplemented by
its rules and regulations, is revealed most clearly by experience in
the cases.7 ' At the time this article was published, updated
official statistics were unavailable, but it had been reported that
the MOFCOM reviewed fifty-two proposed transactions during
the first year of the AML (August 2008 to July 2009) and
approved forty-six of them without conditions. 74 The Ministry of
Commerce provided updated statistics on August 12, 2010,
reporting that, as of the end of June 2010, it had reviewed more
than 140 proposed mergers "and approved 95 percent of them
69 Id.
'o Provisional Rules, supra note 56.
" Id.
72 Id. at ch. I, art. 5, 8-10.
71 See Holmes, supra note 4, at 1.
74 Mayer-Brown JSM, China's Anti-Monopoly Law Merger Control
Regime - 10 Key Questions Answered (Part 1) (Mar. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/public-docs/Client-UpdateChina.pdf.
Assuming a fairly constant stream of transactions, it is possible that the
MOFCOM has reviewed nearly twice that number at the 2-year anniversary
of the law.
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'with no strings attached."'" The prohibited transaction, Coca-
Cola/Huiyuan, involved a foreign buyer seeking to acquire a
well-known domestic firm. The five transactions approved with
conditions all involved foreign firms and, according to the same
source, no transaction involving two domestic firms was rejected
outright or approved subject to conditions.76 The Ministry of
Commerce has recently confirmed that one transaction was
prohibited and five were approved with conditions, and that all
of these six cases involved one or more foreign firms.77 A recent
briefing paper commented that the AML merger articles
generally do not reflect "inherent bias" against non-domestic
firms, while expressing concern about Article 31 and the specific
transaction discussed below.7
The prohibited merger of Coca-Cola/Huiyuan is an early
but instructive example of the merger control process. Huiyuan,
the Chinese target firm, was founded in 1992, in Shandong
Province and, by the date of the proposed transaction, had a
national distribution network.79  It was the largest privately
owned juice-producer in China, selling juice, water, tea, dairy,
and nectar drinks, and was one of the leading twenty-five
domestic brands, according to a survey by the China Brand
Union Association.80 The acquirer, Coca-Cola, had marketed
carbonated soft drinks in China since 1976, and Minute Maid
juice since 2007.1 The proposed transaction, made in 2008, was a
$2.4 billion all cash offer.82 The reaction of Chinese citizens to the
" Ding Qinfen, Anti-trust law treats 'all firms equally', CHINA DAILY,
Aug. 13, 2010, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-
08/13/content_11148199.htm. The Director-General of the MOFCOM Anti-
Monopoly Bureau, Mr. Shang Ming, stated that "a high ratio" of foreign firms
were among those seeking approval of proposed mergers. The merger review
process is a three-stage process, and more than 60% of the reviews were
completed during the first phase, requiring less than a month. He predicted
that further rules and regulations will be forthcoming in the merger area.
76 Id.
" Id.
" Mayer-Brown JSM, supra note 74.
7 Coke Offer for Huiyuan Triggers Widespread Worry for Famous
Domestic Brand in China, XINHJA (Sept. 4, 2008), available at
http://english.sina.com/business/2008/0904/184005.html [hereinafter Coke Offer
Triggers Worry].
so Id.
81 Coke Offer for China's Huiyuan Could Face Difficulties Winning
Approval, XINHUA (Sept. 3, 1008), available at
http://english.sina.com/business/2008/0903/183751.html.
12 See Zhang and Zhang, supra note 13, at 3.
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proposed acquisition was strongly negative: a contemporaneous
Sina.com poll found that 80% of 229,000 responders voted
against the proposed merger because foreign firms should not
take over Chinese "pillar brands.""
The first step in merger analysis, both in the United States
and under the AML, is a determination of the product and
geographic markets.8 4 Huiyuan was the largest juice firm in
China, with slightly less than half of the 100% pure juice
market." If the merger had been approved, the merged firm
would have possessed approximately 37% of a market defined as
"juice drinks," but only 18% of a market defined as "carbonated
soft drinks."" Coke itself had 16.3% of the "carbonated soft
drink" market pre-merger, less than the 17.9% market share of
the largest firm in the market, Groupe Danone.
The parties to the transaction notified the MOFCOM
under the pre-merger notification requirement and the review
proceeded through a second stage review, which stated that the
investigation was proceeding under the AML and not the foreign
anti-monopoly law." On April 18, 2009, the MOFCOM
prohibited the transaction and published a brief analysis finding
that there was a threat to competition, which was not offset by
any justification in the AML."9 The decision does not provide a
8 Coke Offer Triggers Worry, supra note 79.
See, e.g., Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 39. The MOFCOM
has not promulgated a full set of merger guidelines at this time; however, it
published Draft Guidelines for the Definition of Relevant Market, on Jan. 7,
2009, available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zcfbl200901/20090105993492.html. An
unofficial translation is available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
comments/2009/01-09/translation-china-mofcom.pdf and comments by the
ABA Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law (Jan. 30, 2009) are
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2009/01-
09/comments-china-mofcom.pdf.
85 Coca-Cola Puts New Takeover Law to the Test, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 5,
2008), available at http://english.sina.com/business/2008/0904/184124.html.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Zhang & Zhang, supra note 13 at 480.
89 China's Statement Blocking Coca-Cola Huiyuan Deal, The Wall Street
Journal online (Mar. 18, 2009), available at
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/03/18/china%e2%80%99s-statement-
blocking-coca-cola-huiyuan-deal/; See also Coca-Cola in China: Squeezed Out,
THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.economist.com/daily/news/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story-id= 1331505
6 (on file with author); Coke Bid for Juice Maker Turns Sour, CHINA DAILY
(Mar. 19, 2009), available at
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detailed economic analysis of the product market, defined as
"fruit juice." 0 The threatened anticompetitive harm, according
to the decision, was Coca-Cola's power to use its dominance in
the carbonated soda market to limit competition in the juice
market, resulting in higher prices and fewer choices for
consumers; effectively, a monopoly leveraging theory.91 In an
official statement, the agency stated: "If the acquisition went into
effect, Coca-Cola was very likely to reach a dominant position in
the domestic market and consumers may have had to accept a
higher price fixed by the company as they would not have much
choice."" Additionally, the decision found that power of the
brands in the transaction would raise barriers to entry and
threaten small and medium juice firms"- The Foreign Ministry
rejected concerns that the decision was based on national
protectionism. 94 The case raises several issues not yet clearly
answered under the AML and the merger regulations. Did the
transaction implicate national security? Does acquisition of a
famous domestic brand threaten economic security?
3. Abuse of Dominant Market Position/Monopolization
In the first two years of the AML, standards for the
offense of abuse of dominance have been developed through
SAIC rules and private enforcement actions. There have been a
number of private actions, but no reported dominance cases
involving U.S. firms. The important policy considerations in the
monopolization cases are both procedural and substantive.
Abuse of dominance cases are complex, requiring the
decision-maker to apply sophisticated economic analysis to
distinguish between lawful competition and unlawful predation.
http://english.sina.com/business/p/2009/0318/226909.html.
90 China's Statement Blocking Coca-Cola Huiyuan Deal, supra note 89.
9 Id.
92 See generally Fei Deng, Adrian Emch, Gregory K. Leonard, A Hard
Landing in the Soft Drink Market - MOFCOM's Veto of the Coca-Cola &
Huiyuan Deal, GCP - Global Competition Policy at 3 (Apr. 2009), available at
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/a-hard-landing-in-the-soft-
drink-market-mofcoms-veto-of-the-coca-cola--huiyuan-deal/.
" Id. See also Huyue (Angela) Zhang, Problems in Following E. U.
Competition Law: A Case Study of Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, PEKING UNIVERSITY
J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2010) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1569836.
94 Coke Bid Ruling "Not Protectionist", CHINA DAILY (Mar. 3, 2009),
available at http://english.sina.com/business/2009/0322/227849.html.
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The SAIC itself is responsible for investigation and enforcement
in cases alleging abuse of dominance or monopoly agreement. It
has broad authority to decide whether to initiate and decide a
case at the SAIC level, or, where appropriate, to delegate the
matter to one of the provincial, autonomous regional or
municipal agencies."s The need for judicial expertise is also
appreciated, and cases are likely to be directed to the Intellectual
Property sections of lower courts or to the Intermediate Courts
because of their experience in handling complex cases. This is a
positive development that should give litigants confidence in the
quality and efficiency of the decisions.
4. State Owned Industries, Administrative Monopolies
AML Article 7 provides that:
[W]ith respect to the industries controlled by the State-
owned economy and concerning the lifeline of national
economy and national security ... the State shall
protect the lawful business operations ... and shall
supervise and control the business operations of and
the prices of commodities and services . . . to protect
the consumer interests and facilitate technological
progress."96
Further, it requires that SOEs "be honest, faithful and
strictly self-disciplined, and accept public supervision, and shall
not harm the consumer interest by taking advantage of their
controlling or exclusive dealing position."7
Articles 32 through 37 prohibit the abuse of administrative
power.9 8 These strong provisions prohibit public agencies from
abusing their power to limit competition or benefit particular
firms, prohibit discrimination among national regions, and
prohibit special consideration for local firms in public purchasing
9 See generally, Procedural Rules by Administration of Industry and
Commerce Regarding Investigation and Handling of Cases Relating to
Monopoly Agreement and Abuse of Dominant Market Position (unofficial
translation by Jones Day) (2009), at art. 2 and art. 5, available at
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/asia/China/SAICPRl1.pdf
(referred to as Administration of Industry and Commerce [AIC] authorities).
16 AML, supra note 10, at ch. I, art. 7.
9 Id.
98 AML, supra note 10, at c. V, arts. 32-3 7.
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and bidding." These sections, as supported by the July 2010
SAIC regulations, are not typically found in antitrust laws, but
they are appropriate and pro-competitive in the highly regulated
Chinese context. If enforced, these sections are both pro-
consumer - because they promote competition - and pro-private
enterprise, including American businesses that wish to operate in
China.
5. Intellectual Property
AML Article 55 provides that the mere exercise of
intellectual property rights is not prohibited and is not a violation
of the antitrust law, but "abuse" of intellectual property rights
that restrains competition does violate the statute. 00  This
provision has the potential to advance the dual considerations
important to intellectual property: legal protection of intellectual
property as property rights and the recognition that the
intellectual property, including patents, does not necessarily give
the owner the kind of "power" prohibited by the abuse of
dominance provisions.'01
While a detailed discussion of the Chinese laws and
international agreements protecting intellectual property rights is
beyond the scope of this comment, the legal infrastructure,
including creation of special intellectual property courts, is in
development. 02
Conclusion
Chinese antitrust law, interpretation, and enforcement
have undergone significant reform in the two years since the
" Id.
1oo AML, supra note 10, at ch. VIII, art. 55.
'o' This is in accord with a recent Supreme Court decision. See, Ill. Tool
Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). Although the case
concerned a tying arrangement and not a monopoly, the issue presented was
whether market power should be presumed when a product is patented. The
Court rejected the presumption of power and held that proof of power was
required.
102 For brief summaries, see Kristina Sepetys & Alan Cox, Intellectual
Property Rights Protection in China: Trends in Litigation and Economic
Damages, National Economic Research Associates, Inc., (2009), available at
http://www.ipeg.eulblog/wp-content/uploads/NERA-IP-
ProtectionChina_2009.pdf; see also Richard S. Gruner, Intellectual Property
in the Four Chinas, 37 INT'L L. NEWS 7 (ABA Section of Int'l Law, Spring
2008).
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AML came into effect. The organization and staffing of the
enforcement agencies and the publication of numerous
procedures, guidelines, and regulations suggest that capacity
building is important and ongoing. The Holmesian 'life' of this
law shows consideration of international best practices and a
trend towards the consumer welfare model of antitrust thought,
mediated by domestic approaches to national policy and
governance. Moreover, the AML and regulations include certain
non-economic considerations and other provisions, such as
treatment of SOEs and administrative monopolies that are
specific to the national history and development of the Chinese
market economy.
